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THE FATE OF MOROCCO IS DECIDED AT THE BATTLE OF QASR AL-KABIR

by Habeeb Salloum

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                In the annals of mankind there are only a number of battles which have decided the fate of civilizations for decades or even for centuries to come.  Among these are the well-known `Battle of Hattin' when Saladin crushed the Crusader State in the Levant; the `Battle of  Ayn Jalut', when Baybar's Egyptian army halted the westward advance of the Mongolian tide; the `Battle of Waterloo' which saw the defeat of Napoleon; and in our time, the destruction of the French army in Indo-China at Dien Bien Phu.  Another one of these world-shaking events was the little known `Battle of Qasr al-Kabir', an important contest between the forces of Portugal and Morocco.

                In the 1570s, Portugal was ruled by Dom Sebastian who, in 1568, at the age of 14, had succeeded to the throne.  At the time of his ascension he was a sickly lad, willful, conceited and a religious fanatic, indifferent to anything but his stubborn impulses.[1]  He had two passions in life: war and religion.  As the years went by, his obsession was to organize a grand Crusade against the infidels.  What he wanted most was to fight God's enemies and kill Moors.  His primary ambition was to conquer Morocco, but other projects of imperialism in heathen countries also

haunted his imagination.[2]  A zealous youth, he was lost in dreams of conquest and the expansion of the faith.      

                His fond hopes, intermixed with religious fervour, had the support of most of his countrymen.  Ever since the defeat of the Moors in Portugal during the 13th century, there had been an intensification of the Crusading spirit, stimulated by the Christian capture of Granada - some three quarters of a century before.[3]  This had driven his predecessors to invade North Africa and set the stage for his grand design.       

                By the end of the 15th century, Portugal had already gained control of most of the Moroccan coast and was prepared to take over the whole country.  After occupying Azemmour in 1513, as a prelude to their conquest of the important cities of Marrakesh and Fez, patriotic feeling stirred throughout that Iberian land. This is reflected in the words of the 16th century dramatist and poet Gil Vincente who wrote:

                "The King of Fez is fainting,

                 Marrakesh gives loud cries.

                 For Africa was Christian;

                 The Muslims robbed you of it ...

                 But now His Majesty determines

                 To magnify the faith,

                 By making mosque cathedral,

             By grace divine, in Fez.

                 For war, yes, war unceasing

                 Is now his great intent.[4] 

                In Morocco, the on-going invasions caused a ferment of feeling which was to give rise ultimately, after years of fragmentation, to the reunification of the country under the Saadian dynasty.[5]  However, Dom Sebastian was unaware of this agitation, or turned a blind eye to what was happening in that land.  He was fired with enthusiasm while working on his plans for the `Holy Crusade' against the Muslims. 

                The chance to put into motion his strategy for the conquest of North Africa came when the Moroccan Sultan Muhammad al-Mutawakkil, a member of the Saadian Dynasty who was a bigoted and treacherous ruler, was overthrown by his uncle, Abdul Malik al-Mu`tasim, an enlightened and well-educated man.  Muhammad turned to Portugal for aid.  Dom Sebastian agreed to help the disposed Sultan.  However, his real motive was the conquest of Morocco and he began to strip Portugal of men and money for an expedition.

                The majority of Sebastian's counsellors were opposed to his project, believing it to be an insane enterprise.  Nevertheless, with an intense desire to emulate his forbears and egged on by his youthful supporters, he refused to heed any warning.[6]  He mustered all of Portugal's fighting men and hired religious fanatics and other adventurers from England, Flanders, Germany, Holland, Ireland, Italy and Spain.

                Accompanied by this Crusading army and all the chivalry and accumulated wealth of his nation, he set out from Lisbon in June 1578 with 800 ships,[7] carrying, according to some historians, 25,000 men - others say 70,000.[8]  However, Moroccan chroniclers record the figures of 60,000 to 125,000. 

                Dom Sebastian was in high spirits as the fleet sailed southward.  The approach of Africa excited his desire for glory in war against the infidel.[9] The army landed at Asilah and camped on the beach near town.  Here, the Portuguese waited 18 days for supplies, then encumbered by priests, carriages, courtiers and, some historians say 9,000 Andalusian and German prostitutes,[10] and 2,000 wagons, drawn by horses,[11] made its way magnificently inland.  Dom Sebastian's plans were to occupy Qasr al-Kabir, then move on to Fez.

                On July 24th, a Tetouan Jew appeared before the Portuguese commanders with news that Abdul Malik was at Salé with 70,000 men.  Two days later, a French renegade confirmed that the Moroccans had 34 cannons, 17,000 good cavalry and 7000 harquibusiers.[12]  Sebastian's counsellors urged him to turn back, but he refused to listen to their advice.  His belief in his own infallibility and his firm Crusading conviction that God was with him left no doubt in his mind that victory was at hand.

                  Abdul Malik was aware of every movement made by the Portuguese army.  Knowing that it was  a formidable fighting machine, he offered Dom Sebastain extremely favourable terms which the Portuguese king turned down.[13]  Subsequently, Abdul Malik bided his time, refusing to fight except after he had chosen a favourable site. 

                As the unskilled young Sebastian marched his troops into the arid hill country to the south east of Asilah, the effects of heat and thirst reduced the morale and strength of the European soldiers.[14]  Added to this, the wait by the Portuguese on the Asilah beach had given Abdul Malik time to assemble a large army and organize his forces.  A fine strategist,[15] he delayed the battle until he had manoeuvred the Portuguese into an untenable position, setting for them an unsuspecting trap.       

                Sebastian reached Wadi al-Makhazan and found the bridge crossing the river guarded by Abdul Malik's cavalry.  Deciding against fighting for the bridge, the Portuguese king followed the river downstream and, at a shallow section, forded the river and camped his forces on the plain between the Wadi Makhazan and Wadi Warur streams, some 12 km (7.5 mi) from Qasr al-Kabir.[16] 

                Here, the the Portuguese found that Abdul Malik had deployed the Moroccan army before them, blocking the road to the interior.  He had positioned his artillery on high ground and the experienced Andalusian infantry (Muslims expelled from Spain), in a crescent shaped rectangle, to the fore.[17]  Behind them in succession were two other rectangles of mixed Moroccan tribesmen, Andalusians, and other merceneries.  To the rear, Abdul Malik placed his command in a square surrounded by his most trusted arquebusiers, halabardiers and pikemen .  Cavalry formations surrounded the infantry -  the most trusted being held in reserve around the command position.[18]  

                Dom Sebastian stationed his forces, before Malik's vastly greater army, in a square with the artillery facing the Moroccans.  Behind, the infantry was marshalled into three formations.  The vanguard, consisting of Castilians, English, Germans, Walloons and other foreigners stood behind the guns; the centre, consisting of the Portuguese, stood on both sides of the baggage transport, womenfolk and camp followers; and the rearguard, a mixed force of calvary and arquebusiers, completed the square.  The cavalry was divided into two squadrons, one on each flank and -Mutawakkil's horsemen, held as a reserve, to the back on the right flank.[19]   

                Packed shoulder to shoulder, Sebastian's, infantry-heavy pike-and-arquebuse forces, were formidable as a defensive force, but had little room to manouver for an organized advance.  The Portuguese strategy was to let the Moroccans beat upon the pikes and swords until their energy sapped, then counterattack.  For Sebastian, surviving the enemy onslaughts meant victory.[20]   

                On the other hand, Abdul Malik's army of some 70,000 to 120,000, a large proportion sword-and-lance light cavalry, were much more adaptable to attack.  The Moroccan army's major drawback was that it consisted of many tribel elements.  If the tide of battle turned against them, it was feared, they would disappear from the field of battle or defect to Mutawakkili!  Hence, it was essential for Abdul Malik to keep up the momentum of the attacks.[21]   

                On the morning of August 4th, with a cry of bis-m-Allah (in the name of God), the Moroccan gunners fired the first salvo, signaling the cavalry to charge both Portuguese flanks.  Firing arquebuses from horseback, a tactic totally unexpected by the Portuguese, the waves of Moroccan cavalry pulverized the Portuguese centre and reached the Portuguese rear.[22] 

                However, the Portuguese fought back mightily with gunfire and countercharges and began to force the Moroccan lines to crumble.  Describing the battle at this point, Abdul Malik's physician diagnosed the situation as critical:

                "Certain squadrons of the Christians struck to our left  and right so fiercely that our horse and foot retired until they were behind al-Malik's banner....  When the Sharif (Abdul Malik) saw his people overcome, he looked every way to see none behind him, some                   had fled for fear of the gunshots, others to fight."[23]

                Abdul Malik, who was sick and was being carried in a litter, seeing that his forces were falling back and some of the tribesmen beginning to slip away, forgot his illness and insisted on being placed on a horse to rally his men.  The effort caused him to faint.  When he realized that he was near death, he gave orders that no one was to know his condition until the battle was won.  He then named his younger brother, Ahmad, heir to the throne, and in a few minutes fell dead from his horse.  The Sultan was carried into a tent and his death was kept secret from his troops.

                For several hours, the bitterly contested battle raged on, then the Moroccans rallied and engulfed the whole Christian army.  They then attacked furiously until the Portuguese were pushed back and their army surrounded.  In the ensuing hours, due to the heat, the superior leadership and discipline of the Moroccan army, the ferocity of the Moroccan tribal cavalry and the strategy of Abdul Malik, the Christian forces began to give way.  

                Dom Sebastian with his nobility fought bravely, but to no avail.  He was eventually killed, as were the cream of Portugal's ruling class.  In one blow, the country lost its king and its army.[24]  It was a total defeat - the most disastrous battle in Portuguese history.

                 Three of the main actors were lost in the confrontation which became known as the `Battle of the Three Kings'.  Dom Sebastian and Abdul Malik on the field of battle and Mutawakkili, Sebastian's protégé, drowned in the Makhazan River when his horse panicked while he was taking flight.  Some 8,000 of Sebastian's soldiers were killed and another 15,000 taken prisoners.  Barely a hundred succeeded in escaping.[25]

                A crushing defeat for the proud Crusading army, it signalled the decline of Portugal as a great world power.  The country suffered a blow from which it never fully recovered.  Equipping the expedition and the ransoming of prisoners overwhelmed the national economy, and the death of the country's young king led to Portugal's loss of liberty as an independent nation - for some 60 years it was ruled by Spain.[26] 

                The winner, Ahmad, Abdul Malik's brother, was thereafter labelled al-Mansur (the Victorious) because of the momentous victory.  He amassed a fortune from the ransoming of Portuguese prisoners, giving him the means to build up a strong and disciplined army.[27]  This provided him with the necessary power to become one of Morocco's greatest sultans. 

                Also, the battle, by impressing the Spaniards and the Ottomans in neighbouring Algeria, freed the country from external danger, saving it from being occupied by these powers.  Under Ahmad al-Mansur Morocco became a land with which to be reckoned, especially by the empire-seeking European countries.

                The triumph of the Muslims over Sebastian's Crusading army is today marked by the Makhazan Railway Station in Morocco, erected on the site of the battlefield.  Here, the victory is commemorated on August 5th of every year.  It is an annual reminder to the Moroccans of one of Europe's great Crusades which miserably failed.

                                                                                BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abun-Nasr, J.M., A History of the Maghrib, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975.

Barbour, N., Morocco, Thames and Hudson, London, 1965.

Boxer, C.R., The Portuguese Seaborne Empire - 1415-1825, Hutchinson of London, London, 1969.

  Brooks, M.E., A King For Portugal: The Madrigal Conspiracy, 1594-95, The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1964.

Cook, W.F. Jr., The Hundred years War for Morocco: Gunpowder and the Military Revolution in the Early Muslim World, Westview Press, Inc., Boulder, 1994.

Fryer, P. & P. Pinheiro, Oldest Ally: A Portrait of Salazar's Portugal, Dennis Dobson, London, l961.

Hodges, T., Western Sahara: The Roots of a Desert War, Lawrence Hill & Co., Westport, Connecticut, 1983.

Kininmonth, C. Morocco, Jonathan Cape, London, 1981.

Laroui, A., (Translated from French by Ralph Manheim), The History of the Maghrib, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1977.

Launay, A., Morocco, B.T. Batsford Ltd., London, 1976.

Livermore, H.V., A History of Portugal, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1947.

Livermore, H.V., A New History of Portugal, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976.

Marques, A.H. De O., History of Portugal, (2nd Edition), Columbia University Press, New York, 1976.

Meakin, B., The Moorish Empire, The Macmillan Co., New York, 1899.

Myhill, H., Portugal, Faber and Faber, London, 1972.

Nowell, C.E., A History of Portugal, D. Van Nostrand, Co., Inc., Princeton, 1962.

Nowell, C.E., Portugal, Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, 1973.

Payne, S.G., A History of Spain and Portugal, The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1973.

Rogerson, B., Morocco, (Cadogan Guides), Cadogan Books, London, 1989.

Salter, C., Portugal, B.T. Batsford Ltd., London, 1970.

Selous, G.H., Appointment to Fez, The Richards Press, London, 1956.

Wright, D. and Swift, P., Lisbon, Barrie & Jenkins, London, 1971.

Yahya, D., Morocco in the Sixteenth Century: Problems and Patterns in African Foreign Policy, Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, 1981.                                                       

                                                                                                                                                Habeeb Salloum


[1]  Nowell, C. E., Portugal, p. 56.

[2]  Marques, A.H., History of Portugal, p. 311.

[3]  Barbour, N., Morocco, p. 99.

[4]  ibid, p. 99

[5]  ibid, p. 99.

[6]  Fryer, P. & P. Pinheiro, Oldest Ally: A Portrait of Salazar's Portugal, p. 250.

[7]  Salter, C., Portugal, p. 24.

[8]  ibid, p. 24.

[9]  Livermore, H. V., A History of Portugal, p. 255-256.

[10]  Salter, C., op. cit., p. 25.

[11]  Yahya, D., Morocco in the Sixteenth Century, p. 81.

[12]  Livermore, H.V., op. cit., p. 259.

[13]  Barbour, N., op. cit., p. 106.

[14]  Nowell, C.E., A History of Portugal, p., 107.

[15]  Yahya, D., op. cit., p. 81.

[16]  Cook, W.F. Jr., The Hundred Years War for Morocco, p. 248.

[17]  Rogerson, B., Morocco, p. 192.

[18]  Cook, W.F. Jr., op. cit., p. 251.

[19]  ibid, p. 249.

[20]  ibid, pp. 249 & 252.

[21]  ibid, pp. 248, 251 & 252.

[22]  ibid, pp. 252 & 255.

[23]  ibid, pp. 252 & 253.

[24]  Nowell, C.E., A History of Portugal, p. 107.

[25]  Livermore, H.V., A New History of Portugal, p. 158.

[26]  Brooks, M. E., A King For Portugal, p. 21.

[27]  Hodges, T., Western Sahara: The Roots of a Desert War, p. 27.

 

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