THE
FATE OF MOROCCO IS DECIDED AT THE BATTLE OF QASR AL-KABIR
by Habeeb Salloum
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In the annals of
mankind there are only a number of battles which have decided the
fate of civilizations for decades or even for centuries to come.
Among these are the well-known `Battle of Hattin' when
Saladin crushed the Crusader State in the Levant; the `Battle of
Ayn Jalut', when Baybar's Egyptian army halted the westward
advance of the Mongolian tide; the `Battle of Waterloo' which saw
the defeat of Napoleon; and in our time, the destruction of the
French army in Indo-China at Dien Bien Phu. Another one of these world-shaking events was the little
known `Battle of Qasr al-Kabir', an important contest between the
forces of Portugal and Morocco.
In the 1570s,
Portugal was ruled by Dom Sebastian who, in 1568, at the age of
14, had succeeded to the throne.
At the time of his ascension he was a sickly lad, willful,
conceited and a religious fanatic, indifferent to anything but his
stubborn impulses. He had
two passions in life: war and religion.
As the years went by, his obsession was to organize a grand
Crusade against the infidels.
What he wanted most was to fight God's enemies and kill
Moors. His primary
ambition was to conquer Morocco, but other projects of imperialism
in heathen countries also
haunted his imagination. A
zealous youth, he was lost in dreams of conquest and the expansion
of the faith.
His fond hopes, intermixed with religious fervour, had the
support of most of his countrymen.
Ever since the defeat of the Moors in Portugal during the
13th century, there had been an intensification of the Crusading
spirit, stimulated by the Christian capture of Granada - some three
quarters of a century before. This
had driven his predecessors to invade North Africa and set the stage
for his grand design.
By the end of the 15th century, Portugal had already gained
control of most of the Moroccan coast and was prepared to take over
the whole country. After occupying Azemmour in 1513, as a prelude to their
conquest of the important cities of Marrakesh and Fez, patriotic
feeling stirred throughout that Iberian land. This is reflected in
the words of the 16th century dramatist and poet Gil Vincente who
wrote:
"The King of Fez
is fainting,
Marrakesh
gives loud cries.
For
Africa was Christian;
The
Muslims robbed you of it ...
But
now His Majesty determines
To
magnify the faith,
By
making mosque cathedral,
By grace divine, in
Fez.
For
war, yes, war unceasing
Is
now his great intent.
In Morocco, the on-going invasions caused a ferment of
feeling which was to give rise ultimately, after years of
fragmentation, to the reunification of the country under the Saadian
dynasty. However,
Dom Sebastian was unaware of this agitation, or turned a blind eye
to what was happening in that land.
He was fired with enthusiasm while working on his plans for
the `Holy Crusade' against the Muslims.
The chance to put into motion his strategy for the conquest
of North Africa came when the Moroccan Sultan Muhammad al-Mutawakkil,
a member of the Saadian Dynasty who was a bigoted and treacherous
ruler, was overthrown by his uncle, Abdul Malik al-Mu`tasim, an
enlightened and well-educated man. Muhammad turned to Portugal for aid. Dom Sebastian agreed to help the disposed Sultan.
However, his real motive was the conquest of Morocco and he
began to strip Portugal of men and money for an expedition.
The majority of
Sebastian's counsellors were opposed to his project, believing it to
be an insane enterprise. Nevertheless,
with an intense desire to emulate his forbears and egged on by his
youthful supporters, he refused to heed any warning. He
mustered all of Portugal's fighting men and hired religious fanatics
and other adventurers from England, Flanders, Germany, Holland,
Ireland, Italy and Spain.
Accompanied by this
Crusading army and all the chivalry and accumulated wealth of his
nation, he set out from Lisbon in June 1578 with 800 ships, carrying, according to some historians, 25,000 men
- others say 70,000. However,
Moroccan chroniclers record the figures of 60,000 to 125,000.
Dom Sebastian was in high spirits as the fleet sailed
southward. The approach
of Africa excited his desire for glory in war against the infidel. The army landed at Asilah and camped on the beach
near town. Here, the
Portuguese waited 18 days for supplies, then encumbered by priests,
carriages, courtiers and, some historians say 9,000 Andalusian and
German prostitutes, and 2,000 wagons, drawn by horses, made its way magnificently inland.
Dom Sebastian's plans were to occupy Qasr al-Kabir, then move
on to Fez.
On July 24th, a Tetouan
Jew appeared before the Portuguese commanders with news that Abdul
Malik was at Salé with 70,000 men.
Two days later, a French renegade confirmed that the
Moroccans had 34 cannons, 17,000 good cavalry and 7000 harquibusiers. Sebastian's
counsellors urged him to turn back, but he refused to listen to
their advice. His
belief in his own infallibility and his firm Crusading conviction
that God was with him left no doubt in his mind that victory was at
hand.
Abdul Malik was aware of every movement made by the
Portuguese army. Knowing
that it was a
formidable fighting machine, he offered Dom Sebastain extremely
favourable terms which the Portuguese king turned down. Subsequently,
Abdul Malik bided his time, refusing to fight except after he had
chosen a favourable site.
As the unskilled young Sebastian marched his troops into the
arid hill country to the south east of Asilah, the effects of heat
and thirst reduced the morale and strength of the European soldiers. Added
to this, the wait by the Portuguese on the Asilah beach had given
Abdul Malik time to assemble a large army and organize his forces. A fine strategist, he delayed the battle until he had manoeuvred the
Portuguese into an untenable position, setting for them an
unsuspecting trap.
Sebastian reached Wadi al-Makhazan and found the bridge
crossing the river guarded by Abdul Malik's cavalry.
Deciding against fighting for the bridge, the Portuguese king
followed the river downstream and, at a shallow section, forded the
river and camped his forces on the plain between the Wadi Makhazan
and Wadi Warur streams, some 12 km (7.5 mi) from Qasr al-Kabir.
Here, the the Portuguese found that Abdul Malik had deployed
the Moroccan army before them, blocking the road to the interior.
He had positioned his artillery on high ground and the
experienced Andalusian infantry (Muslims expelled from Spain), in a
crescent shaped rectangle, to the fore. Behind
them in succession were two other rectangles of mixed Moroccan
tribesmen, Andalusians, and other merceneries.
To the rear, Abdul Malik placed his command in a square
surrounded by his most trusted arquebusiers, halabardiers and
pikemen . Cavalry formations surrounded the infantry -
the most trusted being held in reserve around the command
position.
Dom Sebastian stationed his forces, before Malik's vastly
greater army, in a square with the artillery facing the Moroccans.
Behind, the infantry was marshalled into three formations. The vanguard, consisting of Castilians, English, Germans,
Walloons and other foreigners stood behind the guns; the centre,
consisting of the Portuguese, stood on both sides of the baggage
transport, womenfolk and camp followers; and the rearguard, a mixed
force of calvary and arquebusiers, completed the square.
The cavalry was divided into two squadrons, one on each flank
and -Mutawakkil's horsemen, held as a reserve, to the back on the
right flank.
Packed shoulder to shoulder, Sebastian's, infantry-heavy
pike-and-arquebuse forces, were formidable as a defensive force, but
had little room to manouver for an organized advance.
The Portuguese strategy was to let the Moroccans beat upon
the pikes and swords until their energy sapped, then counterattack.
For Sebastian, surviving the enemy onslaughts meant victory.
On the other hand, Abdul Malik's army of some 70,000 to
120,000, a large proportion sword-and-lance light cavalry, were much
more adaptable to attack. The
Moroccan army's major drawback was that it consisted of many tribel
elements. If the tide
of battle turned against them, it was feared, they would disappear
from the field of battle or defect to Mutawakkili!
Hence, it was essential for Abdul Malik to keep up the
momentum of the attacks.
On the morning of August 4th, with a cry of bis-m-Allah
(in the name of God), the Moroccan gunners fired the first salvo,
signaling the cavalry to charge both Portuguese flanks.
Firing arquebuses from horseback, a tactic totally unexpected
by the Portuguese, the waves of Moroccan cavalry pulverized the
Portuguese centre and reached the Portuguese rear.
However, the Portuguese fought back mightily with gunfire and
countercharges and began to force the Moroccan lines to crumble.
Describing the battle at this point, Abdul Malik's physician
diagnosed the situation as critical:
"Certain squadrons
of the Christians struck to our left
and right so fiercely that our horse and foot retired until they were behind al-Malik's banner....
When the Sharif (Abdul Malik)
saw his people overcome, he looked every way to see none behind him,
some
had fled for fear of the gunshots, others to
fight."
Abdul Malik, who was sick and was being carried in a litter,
seeing that his forces were falling back and some of the tribesmen
beginning to slip away, forgot his illness and insisted on being
placed on a horse to rally his men. The effort caused him to faint.
When he realized that he was near death, he gave orders that
no one was to know his condition until the battle was won. He then named his younger brother, Ahmad, heir to the throne,
and in a few minutes fell dead from his horse.
The Sultan was carried into a tent and his death was kept
secret from his troops.
For several hours, the
bitterly contested battle raged on, then the Moroccans rallied and
engulfed the whole Christian army.
They then attacked furiously until the Portuguese were pushed
back and their army surrounded.
In the ensuing hours, due to the heat, the superior
leadership and discipline of the Moroccan army, the ferocity of the
Moroccan tribal cavalry and the strategy of Abdul Malik, the
Christian forces began to give way.
Dom Sebastian with his nobility fought bravely, but to no
avail. He was
eventually killed, as were the cream of Portugal's ruling class.
In one blow, the country lost its king and its army. It was
a total defeat - the most disastrous battle in Portuguese history.
Three
of the main actors were lost in the confrontation which became known
as the `Battle of the Three Kings'.
Dom Sebastian and Abdul Malik on the field of battle and
Mutawakkili, Sebastian's protégé, drowned in the Makhazan River
when his horse panicked while he was taking flight. Some 8,000 of Sebastian's soldiers were killed and another
15,000 taken prisoners. Barely
a hundred succeeded in escaping.
A crushing defeat for
the proud Crusading army, it signalled the decline of Portugal as a
great world power. The
country suffered a blow from which it never fully recovered.
Equipping the expedition and the ransoming of prisoners
overwhelmed the national economy, and the death of the country's
young king led to Portugal's loss of liberty as an independent
nation - for some 60 years it was ruled by Spain.
The winner, Ahmad, Abdul Malik's brother, was thereafter
labelled al-Mansur (the Victorious) because of the momentous
victory. He amassed a
fortune from the ransoming of Portuguese prisoners, giving him the
means to build up a strong and disciplined army. This
provided him with the necessary power to become one of Morocco's
greatest sultans.
Also, the battle, by impressing the Spaniards and the
Ottomans in neighbouring Algeria, freed the country from external
danger, saving it from being occupied by these powers.
Under Ahmad al-Mansur Morocco became a land with which to be
reckoned, especially by the empire-seeking European countries.
The triumph of the
Muslims over Sebastian's Crusading army is today marked by the
Makhazan Railway Station in Morocco, erected on the site of the
battlefield. Here, the
victory is commemorated on August 5th of every year.
It is an annual reminder to the Moroccans of one of Europe's
great Crusades which miserably failed.
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